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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Taylor Milk Company ("TMC") brought suit against the 
International Brotherhood of T eamsters ("IBT"), the IBT 
Dairy Conference of the USA and Canada ("Dairy 
Conference"), and its own IBT Local Union No. 205 ("Local 
205") (collectively "IBT") for unfair labor practices in 
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violation of 29 U.S.C. S 187. TMC alleged that appellees 
violated the prohibition against secondary boycotts by 
coercing a neutral party into not doing business with TMC. 
The District Court found that the appellees had committed 
such unfair labor practices and awarded TMC damages in 
the amount of $50,000. TMC appeals this damage awar d as 
too low. IBT cross-appeals the District Court's denial of 
summary judgment and determination of liability. 
 
I. 
 
TMC was located outside of Pittsburgh in Ambridge, 
Pennsylvania.1 In 1995, TMC was operating at a net loss 
caused by meeting the demands of a customer base that 
exceeded the processing and delivery capacities of the 
Ambridge facility. During this same time, Bor den, Inc., the 
well-known national dairy company, had deter mined that it 
would abandon the fluid milk business east of the 
Mississippi River. Borden operated afluid milk plant in 
Youngstown, Ohio, which is about an hour's drive 
northwest of Ambridge. The Borden plant had an 
insufficient customer base and was slated to be sold. 
 
In August of 1995, TMC entered into negotiations to 
purchase this plant from Borden. TMC paid Borden 
$50,000 in order to gain the exclusive right to purchase the 
facility. Joseph Taylor, the pr esident of TMC, hoped that by 
shifting production operations to Borden's Youngstown 
plant, TMC would be able to turn a profit. The Borden 
Youngstown facility was generally a superior facility from an 
operational standpoint and the wages paid to the 
Youngstown production workers wer e significantly less than 
those paid to the workers in Ambridge. TMC planned to 
eliminate the Ambridge production jobs after acquiring the 
Youngstown facility but to keep the Ambridge plant as a 
distribution facility. 
 
The stipulated purchase price for the Y oungstown facility 
was approximately $1,200,000. The finalization of the 
agreement, however, was dependent upon TMC first 
obtaining bank financing for the deal. The bankfinancing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. TMC has now ceased operations. 
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was in turn contingent upon the existence of a stable, long- 
term collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between 
Borden and its labor force, which TMC would then assume. 
 
Toward its goal of forming such an agreement, TMC 
traveled to Youngstown to meet with the Bor den's 
Youngstown employees, represented by Teamsters Local 
377 ("Local 377"), and Eben Byers, the union's business 
agent. TMC proposed a new CBA with moderate increases 
in wages and benefits. Local 377 seemed responsive to 
these proposals, though Byers noted that since Borden was 
the employer of Local 377, any current agr eement needed 
to be negotiated with Borden rather than TMC. Byers 
understandably hoped that some agreement could be 
worked out with TMC so that Local 377's members could 
remain employed following Borden's sale of the Youngstown 
facility. 
 
On August 25, 1995, representatives fr om Local 205 and 
TMC met at a hotel. Local 205 was represented by its 
principal officer, William Lickert. Local 205 had somehow 
become aware of TMC's plans to shift pr oduction jobs to 
Youngstown and terminate workers at Local 205. Local 205 
had invited the Chairman of the Teamster's Dairy 
Conference, Fred Gregare, to the meeting in order to 
negotiate in its interest and preserve the jobs of workers at 
Local 205. 
 
The facts of the meeting are in dispute, but it is clear 
that there were strong words exchanged. Joseph Taylor 
began the meeting by announcing TMC's intentions to 
relocate production jobs. William Lickert responded by 
waving a copy of the union's CBA and stating that Local 
205 had the contractual right to "follow its work" to the 
Youngstown facility. 
 
Lickert asserted that a no-subcontracting clause in the 
CBA prevented TMC from implementing its plan to shift 
production to Youngstown. The CBA specified that "all dairy 
products . . . shall be manufactured, pr ocessed, packaged 
and/or handled by the Employer's employees .. . . No work 
or services presently performed or hereafter assigned to the 
collective bargaining unit . . . will be subcontracted . . . ." 
(emphasis added). TMC maintains that this pr ovision was 
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not dispositive of the plan, since Local 205 would still 
"handle" the products which were manufactured in 
Ambridge and an exception clause excluded ice cr eam and 
some other products from the scope of this provision. 
 
Discussions deteriorated further. Gregar e, chairman of 
the Teamster's Dairy Conference, then stated that he was 
"implementing Article 12, Section 2" of the T eamster 
Constitution and "giving jurisdiction of the Bor den 
Youngstown plant to Local 205." (The parties now agree 
that section 2 of Article 12 conferred no such authority.) 
Gregare instructed Borden to sell the plant to someone else.2 
The meeting ended soon thereafter. 
 
Gregare sent follow-up letters to Bor den's Local 377 
stating that section 2 of Article 12 of the T eamster's 
Constitution was being implemented. Gregar e further 
stated that he was requesting in accordance with section 2 
of Article 12 that prior approval be granted before Local 377 
ratified any collective bargaining agr eement. Gregare then 
contacted Byers directly by telephone and told Byers not to 
re-negotiate the Local 377-Borden contract but to listen to 
any proposals and fax them to Gregar e. At trial, Gregare 
admitted that he had no authority to requir e Byers to 
obtain his approval before re-negotiating a contract. The 
District Court found that Byers complied with this directive 
out of fear that Local 377 would be placed in trusteeship if 
Byers disobeyed Gregare's orders. 
 
On September 1, Borden offered a CBA proposal to Local 
377 that Byers considered "ridiculous" but that would have 
normally served as the basis for a counter -proposal from 
Local 377. Per Gregare's instructions, Byers forwarded the 
proposal to Gregare and did not r espond to the offer. Local 
377 instead sent a letter to Gregare's superiors asking 
whether Gregare truly had authority to negotiate on behalf 
of Local 377 and requesting permission to proceed with 
negotiations. No response was received. 
 
On September 15, Borden again met with Byers and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At trial, Gregare denied invoking Article 12, Section 2, denied 
awarding jurisdiction to Local 205, and denied telling Borden to sell its 
plant to someone else. The trial court credited none of these denials. 
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informed Byers that Borden would have to close the plant. 
Byers continued to follow Gregare's instructions not to 
negotiate. Borden concluded that dealing with Byers was 
not effective and that Borden would have to deal with 
Gregare directly. On October 2, Bor den met with Gregare 
on Gregare's home base in Wisconsin. Byers was present 
for "a very short meeting," but was then excluded from 
negotiations, which were conducted only by Gr egare and 
Borden. When negotiations were finished, Gregare informed 
Byers that a counter-proposal had been made, that the 
counter-proposal had been rejected, and that the plant 
would close. Byers expressed a desire to continue 
negotiations but Gregare refused to negotiate further. 
Consequently, the deal between TMC and Borden fell 
through and the Youngstown plant was closed. All Local 
377 employees at the Youngstown facility wer e terminated. 
 
TMC filed suit against IBT under the Labor Management 
Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. S 187(a), seeking 
damages for an alleged violation of the secondary boycott 
provisions codified at 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4). The District 
Court bifurcated the damage and liability trials. The trial 
court found that the defendants were liable for violating 29 
U.S.C. S 158(b)(4) and entered judgment for TMC in the 
amount of $50,000 plus prejudgment inter est. TMC appeals 
the damages verdict, alleging that it was entitled to a larger 
damages award. IBT cross-appeals the liability verdict, 
asserting that 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4) was never violated. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 187 and 28 U.S.C.S 1331. Our 
appellate jurisdiction is pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
Factual findings of the District Court are r eviewed for clear 
error. Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 v. 2300 Group, 949 
F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991). The District Court's 
application of legal precepts is subject to plenary review. 
Holmes v. Millcreek Tp. Sch. Dist., 205 F .3d 583, 589 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 
II. 
 
1. Liability 
 
Local 205 and IBT state that they did not violate 29 
U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), and that the District Court erred by 
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concluding that they did so. That statute pr ovides, in 
applicable part: 
 
       (b) Unfair labor practices by labor or ganization. It 
       shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor 
       organization or its agents-- 
 
       (4) . . . . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person 
       engaged in commerce or in an industry af fecting 
       commerce, where . . . an object ther eof is-- 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (B) forcing or requiring any person . .. to cease doing 
       business with any other person, . . . Provided, That 
       nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed 
       to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any 
       primary strike or primary picketing; 
 
29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4). 
 
We have summarized the purpose of the secondary 
boycott provision in our opinion in Limbach Co. v. Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1249-50 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
       Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA prohibiting secondary 
       boycotts by unions essentially prohibits union conduct 
       designed to force a primary employer (the employer 
       with which the union has a dispute) to bargain with a 
       union or to force a neutral employer (an employer with 
       which the union has no dispute) to cease doing 
       business with the primary employer. The pr oscribed 
       methods used to achieve the objectives include 
       threatening, coercing, or restraining the secondary 
       employer. See, e.g., Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 
       v. NLRB, 212 App. D.C. 10, 657 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 
       1980). Coercion can include economic pr essure upon 
       the neutral party. Allentown Racquetball & Health Club, 
       Inc. v. Building and Constr. Trades Council of Lehigh 
       and Northampton Counties, 525 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Pa. 
       1981). The purpose of the prohibition against 
       secondary boycotts is to shield unoffending employers 
       from pressures in disputes not their own, though 
       preserving the rights of unions to bring pr essure to 
       bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes. 
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       Anderson v. International Bhd. of Elec. W orkers, Local 
       No. 712, AFL-CIO, 422 F. Supp. 1379 (W .D. Pa. 1976). 
 
Id. 
 
The District Court found that IBT violated this section 
when Gregare, representing the interests of Local 205, 
usurped Local 377's place in negotiations to pr event Borden 
from continuing negotiations with TMC. The District Court 
concluded that Borden was a neutral thir d party and that 
Gregare's actions, in preventing negotiations between Local 
377 and Borden, forced Borden to cease doing business 
with TMC. IBT argues that this was an err oneous decision 
for a number of reasons. 
 
First, IBT suggests that because Local 377 was within its 
rights in "following Gregare's advice" and deciding not to 
negotiate with Borden, there was no unlawful activity. This 
ignores the Limbach rule that we look to the intention of the 
parties in coercing neutral parties, not to the general rights 
of parties to take particular actions. See id. , 949 F.2d at 
1252-53 (stating that the exercise of legitimate rights may 
be unlawful if exercised "for the purpose of applying 
economic coercion to achieve a prohibited secondary 
objective"). IBT suggests that Gregar e was operating in the 
best interest of Local 377 in rejecting its offer, but this is 
contrary to the facts found by the District Court. The 
District Court found that Gregare was not operating in the 
interests of Local 377, but was instead inter fering in the 
negotiations between Local 377 and Borden towar ds the 
end of preventing Borden from continuing in its business 
negotiations with TMC. This determination has adequate 
support in the record. 
 
Second, IBT suggests that Gregare could not have exerted 
coercive economic influence on Borden because Borden 
never intended to negotiate an agreement with Local 377. 
For the same reason, IBT suggests that it was not the 
proximate cause of any damages, since Bor den would not 
have sold the facility to TMC. Again, there is no clear error 
in the District Court's determination that this was not the 
case. The District Court credited the testimony of Byers 
that Borden's initial offer did not indicate an unwillingness 
to negotiate but instead constituted an initial"wish-list" 
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which, through the process of negotiation, could have led to 
more reasonable terms. 
 
Third, IBT suggests that the District Court err ed by 
concluding that Borden was a neutral party because 
Borden was operating as the alter-ego of TMC. Therefore, 
IBT argues, any coercive pressur e applied against Borden 
was legitimate, since it was directed against TMC, not 
Borden. The test of whether two employers constitute a 
"single entity" under the secondary boycott pr ovisions of 
the LMRA is based on: (1) common ownership; (2) common 
management; (3) centralized control of labor r elations; and 
(4) interrelationship of operations. Boich Mining Co. v. 
NLRB, 955 F.2d 431, 434 (6th Cir. 1992). The District Court 
did not err by concluding that Borden and TMC were not a 
"single entity" under this test. 
 
Insofar as Local 205 is merely suggesting that it was in 
TMC's interest that Borden obtain a CBA with Local 377, it 
is also true that successful negotiations wer e in Borden's 
interest as well. Just because the inter ests of TMC and 
Borden were aligned does not mean that Bor den and TMC 
were the same entity for the purposes of the LMRA's 
secondary boycott provisions. It is axiomatic that business 
relationships exist in those cases wher e such relationships 
operate to the mutual benefit of parties. 
 
Fourth, IBT suggests that Borden was not "doing 
business" with TMC because this was a case involving the 
sale of a single asset. This is relevant because if TMC and 
Borden were not doing business, it would be impossible for 
IBT to have coerced them to cease doing business in 
violation of 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). IBT cites Amax Coal 
Co. v. NLRB, 614 F.2d 872, 885-86 (3d Cir . 1980), where 
this Court stated: 
 
       The phrase "doing business" refers to a continuing 
       business relationship which is capable of being 
       discontinued by one employer in order to for ce another 
       employer to accede to union demands. Thus, as noted 
       earlier, Section 8(e) was designed to pr otect neutral 
       employers and their employees, not involved in a labor 
       dispute, from being pressured to assist a union in a 
       dispute with another employer. 
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In Amax, a union sought to bind its primary employer to a 
commitment that any successor to the operation would 
abide by the terms of the current bar gaining agreement. 
This Court held such proposed successorship arrangements 
do not constitute interference in "doing business." The 
Court also held in the alternative that "even if the 
conveyance of a portion of Amax's coal mining operations 
. . . constituted `doing business' " the fact that the 
employees of both businesses were identical made this a 
primary rather than secondary boycott. Id. at 886. 
 
The District Court concluded that Amax did not apply to 
this case because a trademark licensing provision in the 
proposed contract of sale between Borden and TMC 
envisioned a continuing business relationship over several 
years. IBT challenges this conclusion. It str essed that it had 
no knowledge of the proposed trademark licensing 
agreement and that, therefore, it could not have had as its 
"object" the disruption of such a business r elationship. 29 
U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(ii). This point is well-taken. Because no 
finding was made below that IBT was aware of the 
trademark licensing provision, we cannot affirm the District 
Court's decision on this basis. 
 
We conclude, however, that the District Court's decision 
on this issue can be affirmed on the alter native ground that 
a continuing long-term negotiation over the purchase of a 
new asset from a neutral party meets the "doing business" 
requirements of 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4). As we stated in 
Limbach, the secondary boycott provisions are directed at 
preventing a union from leveraging a neutral third party's 
relationship with a primary employer in or der to force the 
primary employer to accede to the union's demands. 
Limbach, 949 F.2d 1249-50. This clearly happened in the 
present case. Gregare disrupted Bor den's negotiations with 
Local 377 with the objective of preventing TMC from 
negotiating to purchase the Borden facility. Gregare's 
ultimate goal was to prevent TMC from cutting Local 205's 
production jobs at Ambridge. 
 
Amax, upon which IBT relies, is not helpful here. In 
Amax, no third party had yet appear ed on the scene. 
Therefore, in Amax, no neutral party could be leveraged in 
order to aid the union in its primary dispute. Here a third 
 
                                10 
  
party did exist and was indeed successfully leveraged to 
allow IBT to achieve its primary objective. Accor dingly, we 
will affirm the District Court's decision on the issue of 
liability. 
 
2. Damages 
 
TMC alleges that it was damaged to the extent that it lost 
the benefit of purchasing the Youngstown facility. TMC 
claims that had it purchased the Borden facility and cut 
production jobs at Ambridge, it would have made a profit 
from the resulting synergies. While the District Court 
characterized the exact calculations of Joseph T aylor and 
TMC's expert witnesses as "rosy," it apparently accepted 
that some profits would have been likely to r esult from this 
plan, dubbed "Plan A" by Taylor. Plan A, however, was 
based on the premise that the CBA between Local 205 and 
TMC would be interpreted at arbitration to per mit milk 
production jobs to be moved to Youngstown. 
 
Joseph Taylor testified that even if the CBA had been 
interpreted in favor of Local 205, he would have still 
purchased the Youngstown facility. T aylor had two 
contingency plans based on this eventuality, and Joseph 
Taylor testified some profits would have occurred under 
these two contingency plans (dubbed "Plan B" and "Plan 
C"). 
 
Damages here are claimed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
S 187(b). That statute states: 
 
       Whoever shall be injured in his business or pr operty by 
       reason [of] any violation of subsection (a) may sue 
       therefor in any district court of the United States 
       subject to the limitations and provisions of[29 U.S.C. 
       S 185] without respect to the amount in controversy, 
       . . . and shall recover the damages by him sustained 
       and the cost of the suit. 
 
It is axiomatic that in the typical case "plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving every element of his case, including 
damages." Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 891, 894 (3d 
Cir. 1975). Violations of 29 U.S.C.S 158(b)(4)(ii) sound in 
tort, and are in the nature of inter ference with 
advantageous economic relations. Allied Int'l v. International 
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Longshoreman's Ass'n, 814 F.2d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 1987). The 
statute here, 29 U.S.C. S 187(b), r equires proof of injury "by 
reason" of an unfair labor practice. These two words must 
be read as requiring that TMC prove some causal nexus 
between IBT's activities and an injury TMC has suf fered. 
Tresca Bros. Sand & Gravel v. T ruck Driver's Union, Local 
170, 19 F.3d 63, 65 (1st Cir. 1994); Feather v. UMW & Dist. 
2, 711 F.2d 530, 538 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
TMC points out, correctly, that if it has pr oven that some 
damage occurred, a District Court is per mitted to award an 
amount of damages that is "to some extent impr ecise." 
Scully v. US Wats, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 515 (3d Cir. 2001). 
All that is required is that sufficient facts be introduced for 
a court to arrive at an intelligent estimate without 
speculation or conjecture. Id. "[T]he law does not command 
mathematical preciseness from the evidence in finding 
damages. . . ." Rochez, 527 F.2d at 895. 
 
Although the District Court did characterize TMC's 
damages claim as speculative, TMC mistakenly attributes 
the District Court's uncertainty to an inability tofix a 
precise amount of damages. Rather, the District Court was 
skeptical as to whether TMC had suffer ed damages at all, 
making the cases cited by TMC inapplicable. See Kemmerer 
v. ICI Ams., Inc., 70 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding 
that where "the very existence of damages" is in dispute, 
equitable principles do not compel a damages awar d); 
Blanche Road Corporation v. Bensalem Township , 57 F.3d 
253, 265 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Our review of the record reveals that the District Court 
did not commit clear error insofar as it found that TMC had 
failed to prove the profitability of Plan B and Plan C. TMC 
was, however, entitled to a determination of whether it 
could have implemented Plan A. If it was likely that Plan A 
would have been successfully implemented, TMC would 
presumably have suffered some damages. To determine if 
Plan A could be implemented, the District Court was 
required to examine all the evidence befor e it, including the 
text of the CBA. 
 
It is not clear that the District Court made such an 
examination. Instead, the District Court declar ed that it 
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would be usurping the role of the arbitrators if it 
interpreted the relevant portion of the CBA. The District 
Court then relied on the following testimony of TMC's labor 
counsel: 
 
       If the whole thing hinged just on winning that 
       arbitration, if it was a gamble, throwing the dice or the 
       turn of the cards, on that alone, it would have been 
       chancie [sic] at best under the circumstances at which 
       we would have gone to the arbitration table. The 
       language was definitely in favor of Taylor Milk's 
       position. The "otherwise handled" language. However, 
       there were no attorneys permitted unless both sides 
       agreed. There were named arbitrators. And I believe 
       had we had ad hoc arbitration with attorneys present, 
       we would have had an excellent chance of winning. 
       Under the burden under which we labored under that 
       contract, I think it would have been a good possibility 
       of winning, but it would not have been a sur e thing by 
       any means. 
 
Apparently, based upon the attorney's opinion that the 
arbitration would be chancy and that there would have 
been "a good possibility" of winning, the District Court 
concluded that TMC had "proved only that it had some 
possibility of winning an arbitration but not that a victory 
was assured or even likely." We find two legal errors in the 
District Court's analysis. 
 
First, because TMC was entitled to prove damages, the 
District Court was required to deter mine whether it was 
more likely than not that TMC would have won the 
arbitration. The District Court could not have done this 
without considering the disputed text of the CBA. The 
District Court erred insofar as it concluded that it was 
precluded from considering the CBA because the parties 
had agreed to arbitrate and it was not pr oper for the 
District Court to opine as to the outcome of arbitration. To 
the contrary, it is not uncommon for a District Court to be 
called upon to determine what the result of a dispute 
resolution process would have been if one party had not 
forgone the opportunity to seek arbitration. 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. TMC was required by law to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that it would have suffered damages. Given the District Court's 
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Second, we conclude the District Court erred insofar it 
relied exclusively on the testimony of TMC's counsel to 
conclude that TMC was not likely to prevail. In fact, the 
testimony was consistent with the proposition that an 
arbitration victory for TMC was more likely than not. 
Although TMC's counsel did suggest that arbitration was 
chancy, he later stated that TMC had a "good possibility of 
winning." We do not see how these r emarks, taken as a 
whole, can be interpreted as suggesting that it was unlikely 
that TMC would have prevailed at arbitration. 
 
We also note that the District Court awar ded $50,000 to 
TMC in damages. This amount is equal to the amount paid 
by TMC to Borden for the exclusive right to pur chase the 
Youngstown plant. At the same time, the District Court 
denied TMC $162,000 in out-of-pocket expenses associated 
with TMC's efforts to purchase the facility. Both parties are 
correct in arguing that this awar d was erroneous as it 
appears internally inconsistent to awar d one sunk cost 
associated with TMC's right to purchase the Bor den facility 
yet deny other sunk costs related to the same transaction. 
 
In the interest of administrative economy, we will clarify 
what we feel to be the correct legal analysis in relation to 
these expenses. If, upon remand, the District Court 
determines that TMC would not have prevailed at 
arbitration and maintains its determination that Plans B 
and C would not have been profitable, it is clear that TMC 
could have suffered no damage from IBT's actions, as the 
loss of TMC's right to purchase the Bor den plant would 
have placed it in no worse of an economic position than if 
it had purchased the plant. In other wor ds, If TMC could 
not have profited from purchasing the Borden plant, there 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
determination that TMC did not carry its bur den of proving the 
feasibility of Plans B and C, TMC was requir ed to prove it would have 
prevailed in the arbitration in order to prove damages. Only if Plan A was 
feasible could TMC have suffered fr om the loss of the ability to 
implement plan A. Thus, some analysis of the likely outcome of 
arbitration was required. Local 205 was the only defendant that could 
have required arbitration of this issue and its failure to do so should 
not 
operate to the detriment of TMC. 
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can be no basis for awarding TMC damages.4 If, on the 
other hand, TMC can prove to the District Court's 
satisfaction that it would have consummated Plan A and 
made a profit, then the exclusive pur chase option and the 
out-of-pocket expenses associated with that pur chase 
cannot be directly recovered. Instead, they should be 
factored as expenses counted against any calculation of 
future profits. 
 
III. 
 
For the above reasons, we will reverse the District Court's 
judgment and remand this matter to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court characterized the $50,000 as money which TMC 
"indisputably lost." Though this is true, the statute is explicitly 
limited 
to losses which occur by reason of the defendant's unfair labor practices. 
Even had IBT not violated the law, TMC would never have recovered the 
cost of its purchase option. Plaintiff 's characterization of this award 
as 
"restitution" is both novel and err oneous. A theory of restitution could 
not justify such an award, as IBT was never unjustly enriched by TMC's 
payment. See ATACS Corp. v. Trans World Communs., 155 F.3d 659, 669 
(3d Cir. 1998) ("Accordingly, restitution damages will require the party 
in 
breach to disgorge the benefit received by returning it to the partywho 
conferred it."). 
 
                                15 
